Bug 2499922 (CVE-2026-15709)

Summary: CVE-2026-15709 SoupWebsocketExtensionDeflate: libsoup: libsoup: WebSocket permessage-deflate Unbounded Decompression Remote Denial of Service
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in libsoup's WebSocket implementation when using the permessage-deflate extension. The extension's decompression loop (inflate()) processes data in chunks without enforcing an upper boundary limit on the output buffer size. While libsoup limits the incoming compressed frame size via max_incoming_payload_size, it fails to track or limit memory allocation during decompression. A separate check for decompressed size (max_total_message_size) exists but executes only after inflation is complete, and it is entirely disabled by default for client connections. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a small, highly compressed payload (a decompression bomb), causing unbounded memory allocation that triggers an Out-of-Memory (OOM) crash and a Denial of Service (DoS).
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Bug Depends On: 2500488, 2500489, 2500490    
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-14 09:43:35 UTC
A flaw in libsoup’s `permessage-deflate` WebSocket extension allows a remote attacker to cause a Denial of Service via memory exhaustion. The internal `inflate()` loop resizes its buffer dynamically without enforcing an upper limit *during* decompression. Because size checks are either performed only on the compressed wire-payload or executed too late (after inflation completes), a small decompression bomb can trigger an immediate Out-of-Memory (OOM) crash on both client and server applications.