Bug 2501724 (CVE-2026-16089)

Summary: CVE-2026-16089 keycloak-services: keycloak-services: Authorization codes can be retargeted to another client session
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, dlofthou, drichtar, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rmartinc, rstancel, ssilvert, sthorger, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Red Hat Build of Keycloak. The issue occurs because OAuth 2.0 authorization codes are not properly bound to the client that originally requested them. An attacker who can intercept an authorization code can modify it to be redeemed by their own client, potentially allowing them to obtain access tokens for a victim's identity.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-17 14:01:00 UTC
A flaw was found in the token endpoint of keycloak-services. The authorization code payload does not persist the issuing client identifier, and the endpoint relies on a mutable component of the code string to select the client session. An attacker who registers a client in the same realm, establishes an SSO session with a victim user, and intercepts an authorization code issued to a different client can rewrite the client identifier in the code. By redeeming this modified code at the token endpoint, the attacker can obtain tokens for their own client associated with the victim's identity. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to impersonate a user to an attacker-controlled client and access the victim's data exposed to that client.