Bug 2501738 (CVE-2026-16105)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-16105 keycloak-services: keycloak-services: Missing per-role authorization on RoleContainerResource composite endpoints | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, dlofthou, drichtar, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rmartinc, rstancel, ssilvert, sthorger, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in the RoleContainerResource component of Keycloak. The issue occurs because certain name-based endpoints in the admin REST API do not properly enforce authorization checks when managing composite roles. This allows a delegated administrator with manage-realm permissions to remove essential child roles from built-in admin roles, potentially disrupting administrative functions within a realm.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
A missing authorization check vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak admin REST API name-based composite endpoints. The flaw exists in the RoleContainerResource where the name-based path (/admin/realms/{realm}/roles/{role-name}/composites) was not updated with the security fixes previously applied to the id-based path. The root cause is the failure to validate that a delegated administrator has the necessary permissions to modify built-in admin roles when using the name-based resource path. An attacker with manage-realm permissions can exploit this by sending a DELETE request to the name-based composite endpoint. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to remove the manage-users, impersonation, or manage-clients child roles from the built-in admin role, thereby degrading the permissions of other administrators within the same realm.