Bug 2506381 (CVE-2026-16743)

Summary: CVE-2026-16743 accountsservice: accountsservice: arbitrary file read via SetIconFile for systemd-homed users
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in accountsservice. The systemd-homed code path for SetIconFile opens a user-supplied filename as root without the validation and privilege drop performed by the classic handler. A local attacker with a systemd-homed-managed account can read arbitrary files accessible to the accounts-daemon process.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 2506690    
Bug Blocks:    

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-23 10:03:17 UTC
A flaw was found in accountsservice. The systemd-homed handler for the SetIconFile D-Bus method (user_change_icon_file_homed_authorized_cb) opens a caller-supplied path as root without the path validation and privilege drop used by the classic handler. A local user with a systemd-homed-managed account can cause accounts-daemon to read arbitrary files (for example /etc/shadow) and store their contents as the user avatar. This issue affects accountsservice versions with homed avatar support (approximately 25.34.76 through 26.13.3) and is fixed in 26.26.9 by reading avatar files as the calling user.