Bug 2507229 (CVE-2026-64339)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer

usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len)
into the caller's buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:

	if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
	    (ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
		return -EMSGSIZE;

txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.

The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
"act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above.

The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single
buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never
leave the allocation.

Found by code review.  The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under
AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s
receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len
checks and the memcpy).  A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is
also available.