Bug 2507269 (CVE-2026-64442)

Summary: CVE-2026-64442 kernel: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
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Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's `rtl8723bs` Wi-Fi driver. Insufficient boundary checks in the information element (IE) parsing loops within the `issue_assocreq()` and `join_cmd_hdl()` functions allow a remote attacker to cause an out-of-bounds read. By sending specially crafted, truncated IE data from a malicious Wi-Fi Access Point, an attacker could trigger a system crash, leading to a denial of service.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-25 10:13:46 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()

Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they
dereference pIE->length:

 - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the
   association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an
   element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte
   past the end of the buffer.

 - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has
   the same problem under the same conditions.

Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a
malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue.

Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info():
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain.
  2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.