Bug 2507528 (CVE-2026-66783)

Summary: CVE-2026-66783 submariner-operator: Release workflow consumes same-org composite action via mutable @devel branch ref
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: gparvin, rhaigner, security-response-team
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the `submariner-operator` component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. This vulnerability allows a cluster administrator, or any user with permissions to modify the Submariner Custom Resource (CR), to specify an unvalidated image path. This lack of validation enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges across the entire cluster, including control-plane nodes, by deploying a malicious image.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-27 15:44:12 UTC
GetImagePath returns imageOverrides[component] verbatim with zero validation — no registry allow-list, no digest requirement, no signature check. The resulting image runs with Privileged: true, Capabilities: ALL, hostNetwork, RW hostPath mounts, on every node (route-agent) including control-plane nodes. A cluster-admin or anyone who can patch the Submariner CR can point any component to a malicious image and achieve privileged code execution across the entire cluster.

Source: Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of submariner-io/submariner-operator.
Finding ID: FIND-006
Assurance: machine_verified