Bug 2507537 (CVE-2026-66792)

Summary: CVE-2026-66792 multicloud-operators-subscription: multicloud-operators-subscription: IsClusterAdmin() trusts user-settable annotations on managed clusters
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
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Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: gparvin, rhaigner, security-response-team
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the multicloud-operators-subscription component. This vulnerability allows a user on a managed cluster to escalate their privileges by creating a Subscription with specific, crafted annotations. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the ability to deploy resources into any namespace with the elevated permissions of the controller's Service Account, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over cluster resources.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-27 15:45:29 UTC
IsClusterAdmin() decides whether a Subscription may deploy resources into arbitrary namespaces (and propagate cluster-admin: true to child Subscriptions). On the hub it relies on the ocm-mutating-webhook to stamp trusted user-identity/user-group annotations. On a managed cluster the webhook does not exist. The function then returns true whenever both user-settable annotations are present: apps.open-cluster-management.io/hosting-subscription (any non-empty value) and apps.open-cluster-management.io/cluster-admin: true. Any spoke user who can create a Subscription with these annotations gains multi-namespace deployment capability with the controller's privileged SA.

Source: Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of stolostron/multicloud-operators-subscription.
Finding ID: FIND-002
Assurance: execution_proven