Bug 2507746 (CVE-2026-64551)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:

	err   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
	stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace.