Bug 2510891 (CVE-2026-64561)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-64561 kernel: KVM: x86: Check for invalid/obsolete root *after* making MMU pages available | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | akito5623, elgueromexicano, rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in KVM in the Linux kernel. This vulnerability occurs due to improper validation of memory management unit (MMU) page roots after these pages are made available. An attacker could exploit this by triggering a scenario where KVM attempts to map memory into an invalid root, causing child shadow pages to inherit an invalid state. This violates KVM's internal integrity rules, potentially leading to system instability or a denial of service within the virtualized environment.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
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Description
OSIDB Bzimport
2026-08-04 07:02:12 UTC
Upstream advisory: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2026080401-CVE-2026-64561-d0d4@gregkh/T Additional exploitability information: A public PoC and full guest-to-host exploit demonstration for CVE-2026-64561 has been released: https://github.com/V4bel/Zapscape The repository includes poc.c, a kernel configuration, and a QEMU launch script. The demonstration reproduces the complete exploit chain under QEMU TCG and successfully creates the root-owned /Zapscape file on the KVM host. The researcher states that this is not yet a directly weaponized cloud exploit, but that porting it to a real KVM environment would mainly require moving the guest-side actions into a kernel module and adapting the exploit to the host kernel configuration. Could Red Hat please reassess the impact and severity in light of this public PoC, particularly the potential for guest-to-host root code execution and local privilege escalation on RHEL systems? |