Bug 2511391
| Summary: | CVE-2026-46625 grafana-pcp: JavaScript Cookie: Cookie attribute manipulation via prototype pollution [fedora-all] | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Srikanth Balasubramanian <sbalasub> |
| Component: | grafana-pcp | Assignee: | sfeifer |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | 45 | CC: | agerstmayr, go-sig, jkurik, nathans, sfeifer, wcohen |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security, SecurityTracking |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | Unspecified | ||
| OS: | Unspecified | ||
| Whiteboard: | {"flaws": ["4f5f478f-ce37-4659-a4c6-4d3e0b900526"]} | ||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Bug Depends On: | |||
| Bug Blocks: | 2487740 | ||
This bug appears to have been reported against 'rawhide' during the Fedora Linux 45 development cycle. Changing version to 45. |
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process. JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.