Bug 2513538 (CVE-2026-72718)

Summary: CVE-2026-72718 goose: Goose: Arbitrary command execution via malicious Git configuration in `goose review`
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in goose, a general-purpose AI agent. The `goose review` command, which uses the system's Git executable, does not properly strip attacker-controlled Git configuration. A malicious Git repository can set the `core.fsmonitor` option in its configuration, causing Git to execute arbitrary commands on the host during an index refresh. This allows a local attacker to execute commands with the privileges of the user running goose, potentially leading to unauthorized file access, modification, or the exfiltration of sensitive environment secrets and API keys.
 Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 2514571, 2514572    
Bug Blocks:    

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-08-10 15:51:23 UTC 
goose is general-purpose AI agent that runs on your machine. Prior to 1.44.0, the `goose review` command runs the system `git` executable to gather the diff for review without stripping attacker-controlled Git configuration. A malicious repository whose `.git/config` sets [`core] fsmonitor = <command>` causes Git to execute that command on the host during the index refresh performed by `git diff HEAD`. The command runs before goose contacts a model and without a submitted prompt, model call, tool approval, or trust prompt. The context-gathering Git process is not sandboxed and is outside goose's tool-permission model. Arbitrary commands run with the privileges and environment of the user running goose, allowing file access or modification and exfiltration of environment secrets and provider API keys. The vulnerable Git invocations are built by git_command() in crates/goose-cli/src/commands/review/handler.rs and are used by touched_files() and collect_diff() for `git diff --name-only HEAD` and `git diff HEAD`. This issue is fixed in version 1.44.0.