Bug 2522945 (CVE-2026-87114)

Summary: CVE-2026-87114 kube-compare: container:// reference extraction runs the image entrypoint and silently escalates to sudo
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, derez, dpaolell, hoberger, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, lpele, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, sarad, security-response-team, sghai, sidsharm, sprizend, suppawar, vlaad
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in kube-compare. When processing a 'container://' reference path, the tool incorrectly executes an untrusted container image's entrypoint instead of merely extracting data from a stopped container. This allows a remote attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the operator's workstation. If the Docker daemon requires elevated privileges, the untrusted code may execute with root-mediated daemon privileges, posing a significant security risk.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-08-24 19:19:48 UTC 
## container:// reference extraction executes the untrusted image instead of extracting from a stopped container

**CWEs:** CWE-829, CWE-250
**CVSS:** 7.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
**Component:** openshift-platform/kube-compare

### Description
When the -r reference path uses the container:// scheme, getReferencesFromContainer pulls the image and starts it with 'podman/docker run -d <image>' solely so that 'cp' can copy the reference directory out. Running (rather than 'create'-ing) the container executes the image's entrypoint/cmd on the operator's workstation. If only docker is available and the daemon socket requires elevation, runEngineCommand wraps the invocation in sudo, so the untrusted entrypoint executes with root-mediated daemon privileges. A reference image name is frequently copy-pasted from documentation or support instructions, making a look-alike malicious image a realistic vector.

### Affected Locations
- `:`
- `:`

### Evidence
**pkg/compare/container.go:88-90 — image is executed, not just mounted**
```go
// run because copy requires a running or stopped container
// -d to output container ID
out, err := engine.runEngineCommand("run", "-d", image)
```

**pkg/compare/container.go:61-63 — docker path may run the untrusted image under sudo**
```go
if engine.requiresSudo {
    args = append([]string{engine.name}, args...)
    out, err = execCommand("sudo", args...).CombinedOutput()
```

### Attack Pattern
A malicious or typo-squatted reference image gains arbitrary code execution on the machine running kube-compare (root-equivalent via the docker daemon on the sudo path).

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*Source: Ex-Wing security assessment, finding FIND-001*