Bug 2532240 (CVE-2026-89608)

Summary: CVE-2026-89608 kernel: ecryptfs: pass packet set buffer size to parser
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the `ecryptfs` component of the Linux kernel. The `ecryptfs_parse_packet_set()` function incorrectly calculates the available buffer size when processing version 1 headers, leading to an overstatement of the buffer's actual capacity. This miscalculation could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially lead to information disclosure due to out-of-bounds memory access.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-11 21:37:41 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ecryptfs: pass packet set buffer size to parser

ecryptfs_parse_packet_set() receives a pointer into the file header, but
it calculates the remaining packet buffer size from PAGE_SIZE - 8.  For
version 1 headers the packet set starts later in the header, so this can
overstate the available buffer.

Pass the actual packet set buffer length from the caller and calculate
per-packet limits from the remaining bytes in that buffer.  Recompute the
remaining length after consuming a tag 3 packet before parsing the
following tag 11 packet.