Bug 2532310 (CVE-2026-80970)

Summary: CVE-2026-80970 kernel: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA) FireWire Control Protocol (FCP) subsystem. This vulnerability allows a local attacker to trigger the copying of uninitialized kernel memory to userspace. By sending a specially crafted short or zero-length data stage during the FCP initialization, an attacker could potentially read sensitive information from the kernel's memory.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-11 22:17:33 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response

fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies
the whole buffer back to userspace:

	buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;

	void *resp __free(kfree) =
		kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
	...
	if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size))
		return -EFAULT;

Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading
step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer:

	err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),
		FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0,
		USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN,
		0, private->bInterfaceNumber,
		step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size);
	if (err < 0)
		return err;

usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or
zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg()
returns a small actual_length.  The only check is err < 0, so a short
transfer is accepted as success.

snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally:

	buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
	...
	memcpy(data, buf, size);

Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged
and copied to userspace.  step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each
validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from
kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512.

On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data
stage, s0 = s2 = 255:

  # init_on_alloc off, no spray
  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255
  000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01
  010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff

  # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag
  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255  tagbytes=232

  # identical run, init_on_alloc=1
  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255  tagbytes=0

  # all three runs
  step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62

a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address
ffff8000805fc4a8.  The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is
exactly the step-0 region.

Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full
step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee>