Bug 2532392 (CVE-2026-89619)

Summary: CVE-2026-89619 kernel: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel, specifically within the `intel-quickspi` driver. This vulnerability allows a malicious Human Interface Device (HID) to send an oversized report, which is then copied into a buffer without proper size validation. This leads to a buffer overflow, a type of memory corruption, which could potentially allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a system crash (denial of service).
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-11 22:44:29 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer

quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but
quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied
response into buf regardless:

    memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len);

qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns,
while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through
HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT.  A response larger than that overflows buf
with device-controlled content.

The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to
quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the
copy.  Do the same here.