Bug 2536369 (CVE-2026-93125)

Summary: CVE-2026-93125 kernel: bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) verifier. This vulnerability occurs because the verifier does not correctly handle certain buffer size arguments, allowing values larger than a 32-bit integer. When these oversized values are processed, they are truncated, leading to an incorrect memory boundary being established. A local attacker could exploit this issue to perform out-of-bounds memory access, which may result in information disclosure or privilege escalation.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-17 17:34:57 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max

check_kfunc_args() detects a kfunc argument named rdonly_buf_size or
rdwr_buf_size and stores reg->var_off.value into meta->r0_size, a u64,
and does not bound it. check_kfunc_call() later copies that value into
the returned register's mem_size field:

  meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
  ...
  regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;

regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size is u32. A constant whose upper 32 bits are set
gets truncated instead of causing a load-time rejection, so the verifier
records a PTR_TO_MEM register with an approximately 4 GiB mem_size for
whatever allocation the kfunc returned. A later access check against
that register uses the truncated, wrong bound.

Reject rdonly_buf_size/rdwr_buf_size values that exceed U32_MAX at the
point meta->r0_size is set.