Bug 2536985

Summary: CVE-2026-72888 perl-Net-OAuth: Net::OAuth: Denial of Service via unbounded caching in smart_require [epel-9]
Product: [Fedora] Fedora EPEL Reporter: Vladimir Vasilev <vvasilev>
Component: perl-Net-OAuthAssignee: Sander Hoentjen <sander>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: epel9CC: emmanuel, lkundrak, perl-devel, sander, xavier
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security, SecurityTracking
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Hardware: Unspecified   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["664dd79c-4806-4112-9a31-1311aaf67908"]}
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2517236    

Description Vladimir Vasilev 2026-09-18 11:47:32 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

Net::OAuth versions before 0.32 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded caching of failed module loads in smart_require.

smart_require stores results in a process-global hash with no bound and no eviction, and keeps an entry for every class name it is asked about, including names that failed to load, because the return value of the failed eval is stored before the error is checked. The key comes off the wire on the server side: _signature_method_class builds the class name from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message, and verify resolves it before any signature is checked.

A remote client chooses both how many entries are created and how long each key is. In a persistent server the hash grows for the life of the worker process until it exhausts memory. Header size limits bound the key length on the Authorization header path, but not on a POST body.