Bug 2540562 (CVE-2026-93802)

Summary: CVE-2026-93802 kernel: wifi: rsi: validate beacon length before fixed buffer copy
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Redpine Signals (rsi) Wi-Fi driver. The driver fails to validate the length of a beacon frame against available buffer space before copying data into a management buffer. An attacker could exploit this issue by triggering the transmission or processing of an oversized beacon frame, resulting in a buffer overflow that may lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) or memory corruption.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-24 17:16:23 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: rsi: validate beacon length before fixed buffer copy

rsi_prepare_beacon() copies the mac80211 beacon frame after
FRAME_DESC_SZ into a management skb whose usable tailroom may be smaller
than MAX_MGMT_PKT_SIZE after alignment.

Validate the beacon length against the actual tailroom before the copy
and skb_put(). Leave ownership of the management skb with the caller on
error, matching the existing rsi_send_beacon() cleanup path.