Bug 2541047 (CVE-2026-97934)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key

"cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined
with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them
by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for
backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the
placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL.

create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record
carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc
word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16
bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there
becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is
small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length
is a kernel text address:

  # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
  # echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger
  # echo hello > trace_marker

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
  RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60
   </IRQ>
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
   event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says
the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and
FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never
look at the field.