Bug 2541824 (CVE-2026-100689)

Summary: CVE-2026-100689 GitPython: GitPython: Directory traversal via untrusted submodule path
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: alinfoot, anthomas, bbrownin, dfreiber, drow, dschmidt, dtrifiro, eglynn, ehelms, gbenhaim, ggainey, ikhan, ilpinto, jburrell, jdobes, jjoyce, jlanda, jmitchel, jpasqual, jpretori, jschluet, juwatts, kaycoth, kshier, lhh, ltomasbo, mburns, mdellweg, mgarciac, mhulan, niyer, nmoumoul, orabin, osousa, pcreech, rbobbitt, rchan, rjohnson, simaishi, smallamp, stcannon, tmalecek, twaugh, vkumar, weaton, yguenane, ykashtan
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in GitPython. When updating submodules, GitPython fails to properly validate the submodule path specified in a repository's configuration file. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by supplying a crafted repository containing directory traversal sequences in the submodule configuration. Successful exploitation allows files and directories to be created, populated, or deleted outside the intended repository working tree.
 Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-26 13:32:48 UTC 
GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.