Bug 2542933 (CVE-2026-102422)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-102422 shell-quote: shell-quote: Arbitrary command execution via improper line terminator handling | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | aazores, abarbaro, abrianik, alizardo, anpicker, ataylor, bbrownin, bparees, brasmith, cdrage, cmah, cochase, csuconic, dbruscin, doconnor, dranck, dschmidt, eaguilar, ebaron, eborisov, ehugonne, ggrzybek, gmalinko, gtully, hasun, ikhan, janstey, jchui, jfula, jhe, jlanda, jmatsuok, jowilson, jraez, jsherman, jtolenti, jwong, kaycoth, kshier, ktsao, kvanderr, lball, lchilton, mstipich, nboldt, ngough, nyancey, oaljalju, omaciel, ometelka, parichar, pdelbell, pjindal, psrna, ptisnovs, rbobbitt, rexwhite, rgemmell, rgodfrey, rhel-process-autobot, rstepani, rushinde, sdawley, sfeifer, simaishi, stcannon, sthirugn, syedriko, tasato, tbish, tlavocat, ttakamiy, veshanka, watson-tool-maintainers, xdharmai, yguenane |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in shell-quote. This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve arbitrary command execution by supplying crafted input containing line break characters after a comment marker. When input is quoted, the comment marker comments out subsequent quotes until a newline is encountered, causing any following text on new lines to be executed as shell commands by the underlying system.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.