Bug 2543250 (CVE-2026-54872)

Summary:	CVE-2026-54872 openssl: OpenSSL: Private key recovery via timing side-channel in generic elliptic curve operations
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status:	NEW ---	QA Contact:
Severity:	medium	Docs Contact:
Priority:	medium
Version:	unspecified	CC:	abarbaro, akhatavk, alizardo, anthomas, aos-team-art-private, asdas, csutherl, dpaolell, ehelms, ggainey, jchui, jclere, jdelft, jhe, jpasqual, jupierce, juwatts, ktsao, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, mdellweg, mhulan, nboldt, nmoumoul, oaljalju, osousa, pcreech, pjindal, plodge, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, psrna, rchan, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, smallamp, suppawar, szappis, tmalecek, vchlup, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	---
Doc Text:	A flaw was found in OpenSSL. A timing side-channel vulnerability in generic elliptic curve scalar multiplication allows an attacker to recover private cryptographic keys. When performing signature operations, such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) or SM2, using curves without dedicated constant-time implementations, variations in processing time leak information about the per-signature secret value. By measuring the duration of numerous signing operations, an attacker can analyze these timing differences to reconstruct the private signing key.	Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
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Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-29 15:53:20 UTC

Issue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for
ECDSA and SM2 signature operations with curves that do not have a dedicated
implementation leaks information about the secret nonce through timing.

Impact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn
information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures
can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the
private key.

CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Description: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for
curves that do not have a dedicated constant-time implementation pads the
secret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time taken
depends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce.

The leak is very small; observing it requires a large number of
measurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group order lies
on a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1.

Applications using ECDSA signing over the Brainpool and other generic prime
curves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic implementation,
are vulnerable to this issue.

The NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated constant-time
implementations and are not affected.

FIPS Impact: no
The FIPS modules are not affected: the approved NIST curves used in the FIPS
provider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use the
affected code path.