Bug 2547034 (CVE-2026-101027)

Summary: CVE-2026-101027 code.gitea.io/gitea: Gitea: Server-Side Request Forgery via repository migration DNS resolution
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerability-draftAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: gbenhaim, niyer, twaugh
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Gitea. When domain allowlists are configured for repository migrations, hostnames are accepted without verifying whether resolved network addresses violate local network restrictions. An attacker with repository migration permissions and control over Domain Name System (DNS) records for an allowed domain can resolve that domain to loopback or private network addresses. This issue enables Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), allowing the attacker to bypass network controls and reach internal services from the host server.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-06 19:33:15 UTC
When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.