Bug 2547072 (CVE-2026-96400)

Summary: CVE-2026-96400 code.gitea.io/gitea: Gitea: Server-Side Request Forgery via migration URL validation bypass
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerability-draftAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: gbenhaim, niyer, twaugh
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in Gitea. When domain allowlists are configured using wildcards, the migration URL validation mechanism fails to block reserved and link-local IP addresses even if local network access is disabled. An authenticated user permitted to start repository migrations can exploit this flaw to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), inducing the server to send unauthorized requests to internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints. This unauthorized access can lead to internal information disclosure or access to restricted backend systems.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-06 19:43:53 UTC
With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did not cover these ranges, and a hostname matching the allow list was accepted regardless of its resolved address. A user who can start migrations on such an instance could reach these addresses from the Gitea server; the default empty `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configuration is not affected.