Bug 2547085 (CVE-2026-94205)

Summary: CVE-2026-94205 code.gitea.io/gitea: Gitea Actions: Arbitrary code execution via improperly authorized fork workflows
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: gbenhaim, niyer, twaugh
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Gitea Actions. When determining whether workflow runs from fork pull requests require approval, Gitea evaluated the identity of the user triggering the event rather than the author of the pull request. Consequently, routine repository maintainer actions, such as adding a label, can trigger the workflow without requiring approval, allowing an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the repository's runners.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-06 19:44:53 UTC 
Gitea Actions decided whether a fork pull request run needed approval based on the user who triggered the event rather than the pull request author. For `pull_request` activity triggered by a maintainer during ordinary triage, such as adding a label, the run was created without requiring approval, while the workflow definition was still taken from the fork head. Where Actions is enabled and a matching runner is registered, fork-controlled workflow code could run on the base repository's runners without an explicit approval.