Bug 2548422
| Summary: | CVE-2026-107935 rootlesskit: gvisor-tap-vsock: unathenticated arbitrary file deletion on the host via /expose [fedora-all] | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Cedric Buissart <cbuissar> |
| Component: | rootlesskit | Assignee: | Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer> |
| Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | rawhide | CC: | asm, bradley.g.smith, gordon.messmer, go-sig, maxwell |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security, SecurityTracking |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | Unspecified | ||
| OS: | Unspecified | ||
| Whiteboard: | {"flaws": ["0b2cf099-394f-4202-b210-3f9a8a557fee"]} | ||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2026-10-14 19:00:13 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Bug Depends On: | |||
| Bug Blocks: | 2548382 | ||
Not reported by govulncheck on v3.3.0 |
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process. A path-traversal flaw was found in gvproxy (gvisor-tap-vsock) in the port-forwarder's /services/forwarder/expose REST endpoint. When invoked with protocol=unix, the caller-supplied local field was passed without any validation to os.Remove() followed by net.Listen("unix", ...) on the host filesystem. Because this endpoint is exposed unauthenticated on the VM gateway (192.168.127.1:80), a process inside the guest VM — including an unprivileged container — could send a single HTTP POST to delete an arbitrary file owned by the gvproxy user on the host and replace it with a unix-socket inode. This crosses the container/VM-to-host isolation boundary, allowing destruction of sensitive host files (SSH keys, kubeconfig, shell/registry configuration) and denial of service. The issue was fixed by removing the os.Remove() call so pre-existing files can no longer be deleted or overwritten.