Bug 2548464 (CVE-2026-97468)

Summary: CVE-2026-97468 org.apache.cxf/cxf-rt-ws-security: org.apache.cxf/cxf-services-sts-core: Apache CXF: Authentication bypass via hash collision in token cache
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, dlofthou, drichtar, fmariani, fmongiar, gmalinko, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, janstey, jnethert, jwon, mcarlett, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pdelbell, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rmartinc, rstancel, rstepani, ssilvert, sthorger, tcunning, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar, yfang
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Apache CXF. The Security Token Service (STS) and token validation components cache validated security tokens using a weak, non-cryptographic hash function and treat cache matches as proof of validity. A remote attacker can craft a security token that generates a hash collision with a cached entry, bypassing signature verification and credential checks. Consequently, an attacker can impersonate other users and acquire valid service tokens under their identity.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-09 10:31:57 UTC 
Apache CXF's STSTokenValidator and Security Token Service (STS) cached validated security tokens under a non-cryptographic 32-bit hash of the token (Java Arrays.hashCode/hashCode()), and treated a cache hit as proof that the presented token had already been validated. An attacker could craft a token (for example a UsernameToken or a self-signed SAML Assertion) whose hash collides with a cached entry. The token would then be accepted without password validation, signature trust verification or a call to the STS. This could let the attacker authenticate as another user and, through STS token validation or renewal, obtain STS-signed tokens for that identity.
Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.2.4 or 4.1.9 or 3.6.13, which fix this issue.