Bug 2548479
| Summary: | CVE-2026-93517 tigervnc: GLX sanitization flaw [fedora-all] | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Rafael Pandini <rpandini> |
| Component: | tigervnc | Assignee: | Jan Grulich <jgrulich> |
| Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | unspecified | ||
| Version: | rawhide | CC: | jgrulich |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security, SecurityTracking |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | Unspecified | ||
| OS: | Unspecified | ||
| Whiteboard: | {"flaws": ["5830f5d8-1405-4ece-a672-e718fff96f78"]} | ||
| Fixed In Version: | tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc44 tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc45 | Doc Type: | --- |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2026-11-11 01:06:00 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7 (tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc44) has been submitted as an update to Fedora 44. https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7 FEDORA-2026-80450b1573 (tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc45) has been submitted as an update to Fedora 45. https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2026-80450b1573 FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7 has been pushed to the Fedora 44 testing repository. Soon you'll be able to install the update with the following command: `sudo dnf upgrade --enablerepo=updates-testing --refresh --advisory=FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7` You can provide feedback for this update here: https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7 See also https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/QA:Updates_Testing for more information on how to test updates. FEDORA-2026-80450b1573 has been pushed to the Fedora 45 testing repository. Soon you'll be able to install the update with the following command: `sudo dnf upgrade --enablerepo=updates-testing --refresh --advisory=FEDORA-2026-80450b1573` You can provide feedback for this update here: https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2026-80450b1573 See also https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/QA:Updates_Testing for more information on how to test updates. FEDORA-2026-6b7d3e80f7 (tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc44) has been pushed to the Fedora 44 stable repository. If problem still persists, please make note of it in this bug report. FEDORA-2026-80450b1573 (tigervnc-1.16.2-9.fc45) has been pushed to the Fedora 45 stable repository. If problem still persists, please make note of it in this bug report. |
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process. In the GLX RenderLarge request handling, the buffer is allocated to the size of cmdlen but the subsequent memcpy copies dataBytes into it. There is no validation that dataBytes is less than or equal to cmdlen, allowing an attacker to write past the end of the allocated buffer. An authenticated X client can trigger this by sending a crafted GLX RenderLarge request where dataBytes exceeds cmdlen, causing a heap buffer overflow. The heap buffer overflow can lead to arbitrary code execution or denial of service. Fixed in: xorg-server-21.1.25 and xwayland-24.1.14 Fix: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/TBD Found by: Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative. (ZDI-CAN-31833) *** Patch [9. text/plain; 0010-glx-validate-dataBytes-against-cmdlen-in-RenderLarge.patch] From e9330cb8dc6571b4e1e5a0189327b6f29b81cf09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer> Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 17:16:49 +1000 Subject: [PATCH xserver] glx: validate dataBytes against cmdlen in RenderLarge first request __glXDisp_RenderLarge() allocates the large command buffer based on cmdlen (from hdr->length, the total command size embedded in the payload), but copies dataBytes (from req->dataBytes, the payload size of the current sub-request) into it. The existing length check only validates that the X11 request length is consistent with dataBytes, not that dataBytes fits within the cmdlen-sized buffer. A malicious client can set hdr->length to a small value (e.g. 12 bytes) while sending a large dataBytes (up to ~256KB or more with BIG-REQUESTS), causing the memcpy to overflow the cmdlen-sized buffer. Add a check that dataBytes <= cmdlen before the buffer allocation and copy on the first request. This vulnerability was discovered by: Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative ZDI-CAN-31833 CVE-2026-93517 Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 --- glx/glxcmds.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c index 58ef861f5d8f..39b187fd9f9f 100644 --- a/glx/glxcmds.c +++ b/glx/glxcmds.c @@ -2182,16 +2182,19 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) } } /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry.bytes + 4, extra))) { return BadLength; } + if (dataBytes > cmdlen) + return BadLength; + /* ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. */ if (glxc->largeCmdBufSize < cmdlen) { GLbyte *newbuf = glxc->largeCmdBuf; if (!(newbuf = realloc(newbuf, cmdlen))) return BadAlloc; --