Bug 2553388 (CVE-2026-104025)

Summary: CVE-2026-104025 peazip: PeaZip: Arbitrary code execution via path traversal in archive preview
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedKeywords: Security
Target Milestone: ---   
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in PeaZip. This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution by convincing a user to preview an entry within a specially crafted archive file. Because the archive preview functionality does not properly sanitize file paths against directory traversal sequences, the application can launch an arbitrary program already present on the victim's system without displaying a security warning.
 Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-15 12:22:01 UTC 
Path Traversal (CWE-22) in the execute_obj function of the archive object viewer (peach.pas) in PeaZip 11.2.0 and earlier on Windows allows an attacker who convinces a victim to preview an entry of a crafted archive via the "Preview with... -> Associated application" action (Shift+Ctrl+O) to execute an arbitrary program already present on the victim's system, with no warning dialog. The function validates only outname (PeaZip's own temporary directory) with checkfiledirname, while the string actually executed is the concatenation outname+tempstring; tempstring is taken verbatim from the archive entry name (StringGridList.Cells[12,...]) and is never validated. checkfiledirname (list_utils.pas) rejects control and reserved characters in the file name but performs no ".." path-containment check, so an entry named ../../../../Windows/System32/calc.exe escapes the extraction directory and is passed to cp_open -> ShellExecuteW; the extracting backend (7-Zip) strips the traversal while the opener does not. In addition, the SECEXTCONST dangerous-extension confirmation prompt is implemented only in the double-click handler (grid_obj_open) and not on this preview route, so an executable inside an archive reaches ShellExecuteW unannounced, and where the prompt does fire it names the entry's display name rather than the resolved path that will run. Arbitrary code execution was demonstrated with a proof of concept against official PeaZip builds, confirmed on two archive formats (.zip and .tar) to show the defect is in PeaZip's own path handling and not in a single format parser.