Bug 2558563 (CVE-2026-114145)

Summary:	CVE-2026-114145 GitPython: GitPython: arbitrary code execution via improper submodule path validation
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status:	NEW ---	QA Contact:
Severity:	high	Docs Contact:
Priority:	high
Version:	unspecified	CC:	alinfoot, anthomas, bbrownin, dschmidt, dtrifiro, eglynn, ehelms, gbenhaim, ggainey, ilpinto, jdobes, jjoyce, jlanda, jmitchel, jpasqual, jpretori, jschluet, juwatts, kaycoth, kshier, lhh, ltomasbo, mburns, mdellweg, mgarciac, mhulan, mwoodson, niyer, nmoumoul, orabin, osousa, pcreech, rbobbitt, rchan, simaishi, smallamp, stcannon, tmalecek, twaugh, weaton, yguenane, ykashtan
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	---
Doc Text:	A flaw was found in GitPython. This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution by supplying an untrusted submodule path. Because the library fails to properly validate destination paths before cloning repository data, an attacker can plant a malicious executable script into sensitive directories, such as the Git hooks folder. Subsequent Git operations then trigger the planted script, executing commands in the context of the running application.	Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:		Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-21 20:51:54 UTC

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.