Bug 2559403 (CVE-2026-114620)

Summary: CVE-2026-114620 authlib: Authlib: Server-Side Request Forgery via unvalidated request URI
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: anpicker, anthomas, dfreiber, dkeler, doconnor, drow, dschmidt, ebourniv, ehelms, ggainey, hasun, ilpinto, jburrell, jfula, jlanda, jowilson, jpasqual, juwatts, kshier, ltomasbo, mdellweg, mhayden, mhulan, nmoumoul, nyancey, ometelka, osousa, pcreech, ptisnovs, rbobbitt, rchan, rjohnson, sbunciak, sdoran, simaishi, smallamp, stcannon, suppawar, syedriko, thason, tmalecek, vkumar, xdharmai, yguenane, ykashtan
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Authlib. A remote attacker can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by submitting an unvalidated request URI parameter in an authorization request. Because the library forwards client-supplied addresses to internal retrieval handlers without enforcing destination policies or allowlists, the server may issue requests to unintended network locations. This issue can allow an attacker to probe internal network services and interact with sensitive endpoints, such as cloud metadata services.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-22 21:54:25 UTC 
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, Authlib's RFC 9101 JWTAuthenticationRequest passes the unauthenticated, client-controlled request_uri parameter to the abstract get_request_object() hook before applying a destination or registration policy; the hook itself performs no network request, while the documentation demonstrates an unrestricted HTTP fetch. In deployments whose integrator implements that hook as an unrestricted outbound fetch, a remote attacker who knows a valid public client identifier can make the authorization server request internal, link-local, or otherwise unintended URLs and can distinguish fetch outcomes through different error responses and timing. Deployments whose custom hook already applies a secure allowlist, destination controls, and retrieval limits are not affected. The JWTAuthenticationRequest implementation in authlib/oauth2/rfc9101/authorization_server.py forwards request_uri to get_request_object() before an application-approved retrieval policy accepts the destination. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.