Bug 2559819 (CVE-2026-98976)

Summary: CVE-2026-98976 kernel: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. This vulnerability allows information disclosure when filesystem mount locks are improperly handled during mount propagation. When a propagated mount is placed beneath a locked mount and subsequently removed, the covering mount is incorrectly left unlocked. A local user in a user namespace can exploit this flaw to unmount the covering mount and access restricted host files.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-23 13:46:36 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath

attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.

Consider two mount namespaces:

(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is
    locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.

Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.

Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:

    Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */

So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount
is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a
lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked
to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is
unmounted again.