Bug 2560230

Summary: CVE-2026-115697 iwd: HE Capabilities validator reads the wrong byte [fedora-all]
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Dhananjay Arunesh <darunesh>
Component: iwdAssignee: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: rawhideCC: pbrobinson
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security, SecurityTracking
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Hardware: Unspecified   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["984a407f-45d4-4e5e-982f-fddfec174724"]}
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2560193    

Description Dhananjay Arunesh 2026-10-23 22:06:30 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

HE Capabilities validator reads the wrong byte
   CWE-125.  CVSS 3.1: 4.3 Medium
   CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
   src/ie.c:2714 vs src/band.c:631
   Introduced 1.30, commit 53988a728533

   The Channel Width Set is bits B1-B7 of PHY Capabilities byte 0, element
   body offset 6 (802.11ax-2021 s9.4.2.248.3).  The validator
   ie_validate_he_capabilities() reads offset 7 while
   band_estimate_he_rx_rate() and wiphy.c read offset 6 from the same
   pointer, so its length guards (len < 26 for the 160 MHz MCS map, len <
   30 for 80+80) are keyed on the wrong byte.  A
   22-byte body with hec[6]=0x1C and hec[7]=0x00 passes validation, then
   drives the estimator into both branches, reading hec[23..24] and
   hec[27..28].  The local adapter must also advertise the width, since the
   two sets are ANDed.

   Passive scanning reaches this path before association.  In a real beacon
   the OOB reads consume attacker-controlled bytes from the following
   element, influencing the rate used for BSS ranking.  Only the HE
   Capabilities element must be malformed.

   The fix is one character: (ptr + 7) -> (ptr + 6).