Bug 2562354

Summary: CVE-2026-112077 radare2: radare2: Sandbox bypass via overly permissive HTTP sandbox policy [fedora-all]
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Oleg Sushchenko <osushche>
Component: radare2Assignee: Michal Ambroz <rebus>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: rawhideCC: rebus
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security, SecurityTracking
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: Unspecified   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["b44519f4-2343-4db1-9b6d-a55a46814740"]}
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2555365    

Description Oleg Sushchenko 2026-10-27 19:33:47 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

A vulnerability was detected in radareorg radare2 6.2.0/6.2.2. This issue affects the function r_core_cmd_str_pipe in the library libr/core/rtr_http.inc.c of the component HTTP Sandbox Policy Handler. Performing a manipulation results in protection mechanism failure. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. Upgrading to version 6.2.4 is capable of addressing this issue. The patch is named 18fd12efa98a7d1977de7bdd379d8a848777b90f. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. The pre-requisite of the vulnerability is reflected by the CVSS vector. One of the project maintainers explains: "There is a real sandbox configuration issue here, but the report overstates it. The HTTP server defaults to http.sandbox=true, so commands received through /cmd temporarily enable cfg.sandbox. However, cfg.sandbox.grain defaults to all, which means all sandbox capabilities - including exec - remain allowed. Therefore enabling the HTTP sandbox alone does NOT prevent commands from spawning processes. This only matters when the HTTP command endpoint is reachable by someone you do not trust. It is not a remote vulnerability by default: the HTTP server must first be started and exposed to the attacker."