Bug 2562960 (CVE-2026-111108)

Summary: CVE-2026-111108 org.apache.kafka/kafka-clients: Apache kafka: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation during request parsing
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: ant, asyoung, ccranfor, cescoffi, chfoley, cmah, dhanak, drosa, dsimansk, ewittman, fmariani, fmongiar, gmalinko, gsmet, gtanzill, janstey, jbuscemi, jhollowa, jmartisk, jnethert, jpechane, jturenov, jwon, kaycoth, kingland, manderse, mcarlett, mnovotny, nipatil, olubyans, ozzy, pantinor, pdelbell, pjindal, prichard, rguimara, rhel-process-autobot, rkubis, rstepani, sausingh, sbiarozk, sthirugn, swoodman, tcunning, varjain, watson-tool-maintainers, yfang
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Apache Kafka. Due to improper input validation during protocol request parsing, the service pre-allocates disproportionately large memory collections based on the sender's declared array element count without verifying that the request buffer contains sufficient data. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending requests specifying excessively large array lengths, forcing substantial memory allocation before authorization checks occur. This excessive allocation can exhaust broker heap memory and crash the service, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-10-28 16:54:13 UTC 
Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender. That count is checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer, which assumes about one byte per element; because most elements need several bytes, a request can declare far more elements than the buffer holds and still pass. For a keyed array the reader then allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count +1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern is emitted into every generated reader, so it affects all Kafka API types with an array field. 


Impact:

Request parsing happens before any authorization check. On a listener that does not require authentication (for example PLAINTEXT), an unauthenticated attacker can send a few concurrent requests that each declare a very large=

array length and allocate many times their wire size in broker heap, crashing the broker with an OutOfMemoryError. The reporter demonstrated three concurrent ~90 MB ProduceRequest (v3) connections exhausting a 1 GB heap (~8x amplification). On listeners that require authentication, the attacker needs valid credentials but no specific ACL, since parsing precedes authorization..


Mitigation:

Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.


Resolution:

From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers cap the initial array pre-allocation at MessageUtil.MAX_PREALLOCATED_ARRAY_CAPACITY (1000) and grow it on demand, and reject a declared array length above MessageUtil.MAX_ARRAY_LENGTH (1,000,000).