Bug 2567722 (CVE-2026-115408)

Summary: CVE-2026-115408 github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11: crypto11: Information disclosure via unverified ML-KEM public key lookup
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
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Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedKeywords: Security
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OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in crypto11. This vulnerability can result in information disclosure due to unverified Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) key-pair lookups. When looking up key pairs, the library does not verify that a retrieved public key matches the target private key, or it falls back to selecting an unrelated public key if identifiers are missing. An attacker with access to the cryptographic token can plant a substitute public key, causing the application to encrypt shared secrets using the attacker's key and compromising the confidentiality of protected data.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-05 22:20:47 UTC 
In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `>= 2.0.0-rc3, <= 2.0.0-rc8`, the ML-KEM key-pair lookup functions (`FindMLKEMKeyPair`, `FindMLKEMKeyPairs`, `FindMLKEMKeyPairsWithAttributes`) locate the public half of an ML-KEM key pair by `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` and never verify it against the private key. In addition, the "ID only" fallback search runs even when the private key has no `CKA_ID`, so the search template reduces to the public-key class and the ML-KEM key type and the first ML-KEM public key on the token is returned. `Encapsulate()` on the resulting key pair encrypts the fresh shared secret to that key, so its owner — not the holder of the private key the caller looked up — can recover the secret. An attacker who can open an unauthenticated session on the token and plant a public `CKK_ML_KEM` object carrying the victim's `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` receives the shared secrets for encapsulations performed through the substituted key pair, compromising the confidentiality of those secrets and of everything protected by keys derived from them. The v1 module paths have no ML-KEM support and are not affected.