Bug 2567927 (CVE-2026-116472)

Summary: CVE-2026-116472 ingress-nginx: ingress-nginx: Denial of Service via mirror-target annotation
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
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Version: unspecifiedKeywords: Security
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OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in ingress-nginx. An authenticated user with permission to create Ingress resources can leverage the mirror-target annotation to send write commands to an unauthenticated internal configuration interface. This action corrupts the controller configuration, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) where all data plane network traffic is dropped.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-05 22:36:58 UTC 
A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where a user with permission to create an Ingress may be able to cause denial of service of the ingress-nginx data plane, or possibly redirect traffic from other Ingresses. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using ingress-nginx.

Due to a missing check, the mirror-target Ingress annotation can be used to target an unauthenticated configuration API within the ingress-nginx controller, allowing write commands to be submitted. Corrupting the data within that configuration API results in all traffic through ingress-nginx being dropped until an Ingress configuration change or a controller restart causes the data to be recreated correctly.

In principle, this write access could also be used to redirect traffic from other Ingresses controlled by the same ingress-nginx instance. In practice, there is negligible additional risk: such redirection would require privileged information about internal ingress-nginx state, and users can already redirect traffic from other Ingresses controlled by the same ingress-nginx anyway.