Bug 2568710 (CVE-2026-123592)

Summary: CVE-2026-123592 hickory-net: hickory-net: DNSSEC validation bypass via domain name hash collision
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the hickory-net component of Hickory DNS. Domain name hashing within the validation cache ignores label lengths, allowing distinct domain names that vary only in dot positions to produce identical hash values. A remote attacker controlling an unsigned domain can exploit this issue to prime the cache with an insecure status, bypassing Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation and causing forged DNS responses to be accepted as valid.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-08 02:01:55 UTC
The hickory-net crate in Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 allows DNSSEC validation bypass because Name's Hash ignores label lengths and ValidationCacheKey compares only that hash. An attacker controlling an unsigned delegation whose name differs from a signed target only in dot positions can prime an Insecure verdict, causing forged answers for the target to skip signature verification instead of returning SERVFAIL.