Bug 2568712 (CVE-2026-123579)

Summary: CVE-2026-123579 hickory-net: hickory-proto: Hickory DNS: DNSSEC validation bypass via wildcard record expansion
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: dbosanac, jcantril, jlanda, jreimann, kshier, mdessi, mrizzi, pcattana, rbobbitt, rhel-process-autobot, rojacob, simaishi, stcannon, watson-tool-maintainers, yguenane
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Hickory DNS. The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation mechanism does not properly distinguish NODATA responses from wildcard-expanded positive responses. For a query that should return no data in a zone with wildcard records, a remote attacker can combine an authentic proof-of-nonexistence record with a signed wildcard record to craft a fraudulent response. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to bypass DNSSEC validation and inject spoofed DNS records.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-08 02:01:55 UTC 
DNSSEC validation in Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 does not distinguish NODATA responses from wildcard-expanded positive responses. For a query that should return NODATA in a zone with wildcard records, an attacker can combine an NSEC3 record matching the query name with a signed wildcard record into a bogus positive response that validation accepts.