Bug 2568748 (CVE-2026-123599)

Summary: CVE-2026-123599 hickory-proto: hickory-net: Hickory DNS: DNSSEC validation bypass via improper record class handling
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: dbosanac, jcantril, jlanda, jreimann, kshier, mdessi, mrizzi, pcattana, rbobbitt, rhel-process-autobot, rojacob, simaishi, stcannon, watson-tool-maintainers, yguenane
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in Hickory DNS. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to bypass DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) signature verification by providing forged non-standard DNS class records. Because the validator fails to consider the record class during verification, unverified records are incorrectly marked as secure. An attacker capable of supplying DNS responses can exploit this flaw to spoof authenticated DNS records and forge child zone responses.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 2579485, 2579486, 2579488    
Bug Blocks:    

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-08 02:01:57 UTC
Hickory DNS hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because verify_rrsets() ignores DNS class when partitioning RRsets, so non-IN records skip signature verification yet are marked secure when the IN records verify. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can include forged CH or HS class records, including DS records, to authenticate any DNSKEY and forge child zone responses.