Bug 2568763 (CVE-2026-123587)

Summary: CVE-2026-123587 hickory-net: hickory-net: DNSSEC validation bypass via unverified SOA records
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in hickory-net. During Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation, unverified Start of Authority (SOA) records are accepted when evaluating Next Secure (NSEC) records. A remote attacker capable of providing DNS responses can exploit this vulnerability by combining a genuine NSEC record with a crafted SOA record to forge the nonexistence of arbitrary domain records. This allows the attacker to bypass DNSSEC integrity checks and cause client applications to fail when resolving legitimate domain names.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-08 02:02:08 UTC
The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.