Bug 2568770 (CVE-2026-123580)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-123580 hickory-net: hickory-proto: Hickory DNS: DNSSEC nonexistence proof forgery via improper NSEC3 zone validation | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | dbosanac, jcantril, jlanda, jreimann, kshier, mdessi, mrizzi, pcattana, rbobbitt, rhel-process-autobot, rojacob, simaishi, stcannon, watson-tool-maintainers, yguenane |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in Hickory DNS. A remote attacker can forge Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) nonexistence proofs by supplying Next Secure (NSEC3) records from an unauthorized zone with a matching hashed label. This vulnerability occurs because the DNSSEC verification logic compares only the hashed label without validating that the record belongs to the correct zone. Consequently, an attacker can manipulate DNS responses to falsely indicate that legitimate domain records do not exist.
|
Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
|
Description
OSIDB Bzimport
2026-11-08 02:06:14 UTC
|