Bug 2568979

Summary: CVE-2026-116246 pgadmin4: pgAdmin 4: Credential exposure via shared process environment [fedora-all]
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Vladimir Vasilev <vvasilev>
Component: pgadmin4Assignee: Sandro Mani <manisandro>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: rawhideCC: manisandro
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security, SecurityTracking
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: Unspecified   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["0d83a9ec-8894-4560-af59-cb5c252ed494"]}
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2568372    

Description Vladimir Vasilev 2026-11-09 08:09:20 UTC 
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

To pass a server's password to psql and to the utilities pgAdmin 4 runs as background processes, the server manager wrote it into pgAdmin's own process environment: as PGPASSWORD for the PSQL tool, and under a per-process variable for a utility. Nothing removed it afterwards. pgAdmin's environment is shared by every user's requests and copied into every process it starts, so in server mode another user's later PSQL session or utility inherited the password, and libpq used PGPASSWORD for any connection made without a password of its own, letting one user connect with another user's saved password.

The fix puts the password only into the environment built for the process that needs it and starts psql with a copy of pgAdmin's environment instead of the environment itself.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.