Bug 2573752 (CVE-2026-128842)

Summary: CVE-2026-128842 busboy: busboy: Denial of Service via URL-encoded field limit bypass
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: abarbaro, akostadi, alizardo, amasferr, bbrownin, dhanak, dmayorov, drosa, dsimansk, eborisov, jchui, jhe, jlanda, jlledo, kingland, kshier, ktsao, lball, mnovotny, nboldt, ngough, oaljalju, pantinor, psrna, rbobbitt, sausingh, simaishi, stcannon, tsedmik, veshanka, yguenane
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in busboy. When processing URL-encoded form data, the parser checks if a field's length strictly equals the configured per-field limit rather than checking if the limit is reached or exceeded. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can supply malformed percent-encoded characters that cause the length check to be bypassed. As a result, the parser continues buffering the field in memory up to the total request size, leading to excessive memory consumption and a potential Denial of Service (DoS).
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-16 21:36:42 UTC
@fastify/busboy is a streaming parser for multipart and url-encoded form data used by Fastify. In versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.5, the url-encoded parser stops accumulating a field only when the decoded length exactly equals the configured per-field size limit, and a malformed percent escape is passed through verbatim by the decoder, so the decoded length can jump from just below the limit to just above it and skip that equality check. The parser then keeps buffering the field in memory until the next delimiter or the end of the request, so a single unauthenticated url-encoded field or field name can grow to the size of the whole request body regardless of a much smaller configured per-field limit, with memory use bounded only by the independent whole-request body limit. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.6, which clamps a field as soon as the decoded length reaches or exceeds the limit, and users should upgrade to 3.2.6 or later. As a workaround, set a conservative whole-request body limit so the per-field overshoot cannot exceed it.