Bug 2573762 (CVE-2026-99296)

Summary: CVE-2026-99296 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via truncated monitor replies in libceph
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Ceph network client module (libceph). A compromised or malicious storage monitor can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending truncated command acknowledgment messages. Because the kernel checks message boundaries using the preallocated buffer size rather than the actual received length, it reads uninitialized memory instead of valid response data. This condition can trigger an unhandled memory fault, leading to a system crash.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-16 21:37:26 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len

handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size
of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the
monitor sent.  mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to
get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever
generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size
however short the reply is.  An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct
ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes
ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never
received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or
bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and
is then rejected.  The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not
flag it.

req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),
ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back
from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes
it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:

  rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)
   vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)
   ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),
handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().
A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one
takes the existing bad: path.  This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph:
bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side
use of front_alloc_len in this file.