Bug 2573810 (CVE-2026-99307)

Summary: CVE-2026-99307 kernel: kernel: ceph: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read during lease parsing
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Ceph file system (CephFS) client. When processing directory lease replies from a Metadata Server (MDS), the client fails to verify that the received record length is sufficient to contain the full lease structure. A malicious or compromised server could exploit this issue by sending a crafted reply with a truncated record size. This causes the client to read beyond buffer boundaries during file lookups, resulting in an out-of-bounds memory read that can crash the system, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) or potential disclosure of sensitive kernel memory.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-16 21:40:41 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: require the dentry lease record to cover struct ceph_mds_reply_lease

parse_reply_info_lease() reads a 32-bit struct_len off the wire and only
checks that many bytes are present, without requiring struct_len to cover
sizeof(struct ceph_mds_reply_lease) (10 bytes).  A malicious MDS can
declare a shorter record and still get the pointer published: the
following *p += sizeof(**lease) overshoot is undone by *p = lend, so
nothing downstream rejects the reply.  ceph_fill_trace() ->
update_dentry_lease() then reads 10 bytes through that pointer on any
lookup on a mounted CephFS, running past the end of the message front.

Require the record to cover the structure, matching the sibling
parse_reply_info_dir().  A conforming MDS always encodes the full 10
bytes.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459)
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888026c63d65 by task kworker/0:3/2366
  Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
  Call Trace:
   __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459)
   ceph_fill_trace (fs/ceph/inode.c:1474 fs/ceph/inode.c:1823)
   mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:4229 fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7225)
   ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)
   ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)
   ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

  The buggy address is located 357 bytes inside of
   allocated 360-byte region [ffff888026c63c00, ffff888026c63d68)