Bug 2576161 (CVE-2026-104357)

Summary: CVE-2026-104357 libtirpc: libtirpc: SunRPC UDP datagram-boundary violation (stale buffer bytes decoded as current request)
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
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Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, security-response-team, watson-tool-maintainers
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in libtirpc. The SunRPC UDP/datagram server transport reuses a single receive buffer across requests and resets the XDR decode position without rebinding the decode length to the size of the datagram actually received. As a result, when a short UDP RPC request is received after a longer one, the XDR decoder can read stale bytes left in the reused buffer and interpret them as part of the current request, including credential, verifier, or procedure-argument fields. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity for services that use a UDP-based SunRPC server.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 03:01:54 UTC
A flaw was found in libtirpc. The SunRPC UDP/datagram server transport (svc_dg_recv / svcudp_create) reuses a single XDR decode stream sized to the allocated receive buffer. On each datagram, the receive path resets the stream position and calls xdr_callmsg, but it does not rebind the decode bound (x_handy) to the actual received length rlen. Because the XDR memory backend uses x_handy as the remaining length, a shorter request can be decoded together with stale bytes left by a prior datagram. Florian Weimer reproduced this with tst-udp-stale: a full request leaves argument bytes at the tail of the buffer after a shorter reply is encoded; a follow-up truncated AUTH_NONE call with no arguments then has svc_getargs consume those leftover bytes and echo them back. A correctly bounded decoder would fail with GARBAGE_ARGS. This is a logical datagram-boundary violation, not a read past the allocated buffer. The same inherited SunRPC pattern exists in glibc sunrpc/svc_udp.c (legacy ABI compatibility; glibc is expected to assign a separate CVE) and in other copies such as krb5 GSSRPC. CVE-2026-104357 is assigned to the libtirpc implementation. Reported by Aisle Research against glibc; Red Hat confirmed the bug is present in libtirpc. Related tracking: OSIM-77274 / RHEL-217046 (glibc report), PSIRTSUPT-22635 (coordination).