Bug 2576667 (CVE-2026-99379)

Summary: CVE-2026-99379 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via integer wrap in SMB1 extended attribute parsing
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. A malicious SMB (Server Message Block) server can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending a specially crafted response to a client using SMB1. On 32-bit architectures, improper bounds checking allows an integer wrap when calculating the length of extended attribute lists, causing the client to read beyond the received response buffer and crash the system.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 14:32:19 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: validate SMB1 EA list bounds before parsing

CIFSSMBQAllEAs() checks the server-provided EA list length by adding it
to the response pointer. On 32-bit systems, a positive length can wrap
the pointer and pass the comparison. The parser then walks outside the
received response while reading the next FEA header.

A response with a list length of 0x40000000 reproduces this as a native
i386 page fault and kernel panic from listxattr() against an SMB1
server.

Check that the EA list starts within the SMB byte area before reading
its header. Keep its length unsigned and compare it with the bytes left
in the response without pointer addition.

SMB1 is not negotiated by default and requires an explicit vers=1.0
mount.