Bug 2576719 (CVE-2026-99362)

Summary: CVE-2026-99362 kernel: kernel: Out-of-bounds write in nfsd via crafted SEQUENCE compound requests
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: urgent Docs Contact:
Priority: urgent    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
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A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Network File System daemon (nfsd). A remote client can trigger an out-of-bounds memory write by negotiating a minimal cached reply size and sending crafted compound requests containing SEQUENCE operations. This issue occurs because the server fails to verify that the response fits within negotiated buffer limits before caching it, causing response data to be written past the end of the allocated buffer. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause memory corruption and a system crash, resulting in a denial of service (DoS), or potentially execute arbitrary code.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 14:36:36 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot

nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached
reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate
ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and
nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A
COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the
SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows.
nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running
nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves
op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having
succeeded.

nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that
returned an error. That test reads the status the operation
reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and
takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the
zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so
the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
  Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24
   __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60
   read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
   nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810
   nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240

Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following
operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing
the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply
cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of
an error returned from SEQUENCE.